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CHAPTER TWO
‘Allowing it to speak out of him’:
The Heterobiographies of David Malouf,
Antonio Tabucchi and Marguerite
Yourcenar
   
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    
We know very little about the life of Ovid, and it is this absence of fact that has
made him useful as the central figure of my narrative and allowed me the liberty
of free invention, since what I wanted to write was neither historical novel nor
biography, but a fiction with its roots in possible event.1
Thus starts the Afterword of David Malouf’s An Imaginary Life, a novel
in which the poet Ovid, exiled from Rome, narrates his experience in
the border outpost of Tomis, near the delta of the Danube on the Black
Sea. ‘Relegated’ among the Getae at the edges of the Empire and
‘expelled from the confines of [the] Latin tongue’ (IL p. 26), this
glittering and cynical poet undergoes a series of changes or meta-
morphoses. Initially pining for Rome and its sophisticated, complex
language, he learns to overcome his hostility towards the barbarous
people and their tongue, but when he discovers a wild Child that had
been raised by the wolves in the forest and captures him with the
intention of teaching him to speak and to be human, he soon realises
that he himself has to learn from the Child another language, based not
on symbolization and arbitrary convention but on an intuitive identity
with things, on becoming the things signified in silence: ‘In imitating
the birds, he is not, like our mimics, copying something that is outside
him [...]. He is being the bird. He is allowing it to speak out of him’
(IL p. 92); ‘my knowing that it is sky, that the stars have names and a
history prevents my being the sky. It rains and I say, it rains. It
thunders and I say, it thunders. The Child is otherwise. I try to think as
he must: I am raining, I am thundering’ (IL p. 96). After the death of
the village’s elderly chief, which the villagers blame on the child’s
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demonic powers, the poet and the Child escape across the frozen river.
Ovid’s death in the grasslands of the north is the poet’s final trans-
formation, perhaps a literal metamorphosis like the ones described in
Ovid’s great poem. Malouf’s Afterword concludes: ‘My purpose was to
make this glib fabulist of “the changes” live out in reality what had
been, in his previous existence, merely the occasion for dazzling
literary display’ (IL p. 154).
Is Malouf’s novel then a fantasy inspired by ‘mere’ literary dazzle
or, as ‘a fiction with its roots in possible event’, is it a work that, while
not laying claim to the factual accuracy of biography or the broad
reliability of the historical background of a historical novel, can
however still claim to be rooted in verisimilitude, in events that, although
not documented, are nevertheless possible, as would be the case with a
realist novel, or in Aristotelian poetics? The Afterword thematizes a
tension between the desire to anchor the novel to history and the desire
to free Ovid from historical necessity. How can Ovid live out ‘in
reality’ the metamorphoses to which he is subjected, if metamorphoses
are but the occasion for ‘literary display’?
I shall come back in the second half of this essay to the question of
how the novel and its Afterword construct, or excavate, in the story of
Ovid’s exile and death, a history of the myth of Ovid and, especially,
another history, central not only to this book but to autobiography
more generally: that of the concept of man, of what it means to be
human. First, however, I want to place An Imaginary Life in the context
of other ‘autobiografictional’ texts and the issues that these raise.
  
The tension between historicity and the desire to free the subject from
historical necessity also defines, more widely, the large number of
novels written as if they were the autobiographies of historical person-
ages, novels that gesture towards historical factuality and literary
fictionality, towards ‘truth’ and invention, and exist under the sign of
an essential structural displacement (the ‘autobiography’ is written by
another) that brings to the foreground structural, narrative, and ethical
issues also central to autobiography itself.
A list of such fictional autobiographies of historical characters would
also include Marguerite Yourcenar’s 1951 Mémoires d’Hadrien;2  Michael
Ondaatje’s 1981 The Collected Works of Billy the Kid;3  Peter Carey’s
2000 True History of the Kelly Gang;4  Manuel Vázquez Montalbán’s
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1992 Autobiografía del general Franco.5  I wish to add to this list (and
shall explain this apparent anomaly shortly) Antonio Tabucchi’s 1994
The Last Three Days of Fernando Pessoa,6  although this brief narrative
of the Portuguese poet’s final days and imagined encounter with his
heteronyms is written in the third person, thus apparently defying the
description of ‘fictional autobiography’.
These novels raise a number of issues – first of all, macroscopically,
about generic boundaries and generic assumptions. We know they are
not autobiographies: they do not advertise themselves as such, we do
not expect their authors to be bound by any Lejeunian autobiographical
pact;7  yet they bring into focus precisely the thinness of the dividing
line between the autobiographical (they are written in the first person)
and the biographical (they are written by another), between the histor-
ical (the protagonists are recognizable individuals who we know to have
lived) and the fictional (they exist within texts that are not bound by
any duty of fidelity to facts). This raises therefore further questions
concerning the nature and status of the subject in and of writing: in the
fictional autobiography of a historical character, the grammatical first
person becomes the site of an encounter, a stage where the complex
relationships between historical, fictional and authorial subjectivities are
played out and explored. Central to all this is the issue of the name: its
nature, the assumptions that underpin its use and its legal status, the
assumptions made about its uniqueness. How can someone – Malouf,
Yourcenar, Ondaatje, Vázquez Montalbán – assume the name of
another and speak for them? There is something somewhat disturbing
and thrilling in this identity theft (would we feel so indulgent if it were
our name and identity being thus usurped?). The name carries an
authority: the authority to authorise a credit transaction, for example;
to sentence someone to exile. What happens to the name and its
authority when it is claimed by someone else who can say ‘I’ under
false pretences? (But if there is no intention to cheat, are these true
pretences?) When the authority taken over is that of an emperor whose
word has a performative value, and whose words, once uttered, become
law? When the authority taken over is that of someone whose business
is to speak fictions, such as that of the poet of Metamorphoses, or of the
poet who defines the poet’s role as that of being a faker, a pretender?8
These are questions fraught with more dangers than meet the I –
fatal questions perhaps, insofar as they also raise the issues of writing’s
relation to death, on which Blanchot, Barthes and others since have
written so variously and so eloquently,9  and of the inextricable link of
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the autobiographical to the thanatographical (this is discussed at length
by Ivan Callus in his contribution to this issue of Comparative Critical
Studies). I shall come back to writing and death later, but I wish to
approach this relationship first from two more limited but related
angles, more immediately relevant to the subject matter and structure
of the novels that are the focus of this essay, and to the structure of
auto/biography.
Ovid, Hadrian, Pessoa write as they approach death – literally
approaching it in the case of Hadrian (‘Comme le voyageur qui navigue
entre les îles de l’Archipel voit la buée lumineuse se lever vers le soir,
et découvre peu à peu la ligne du rivage, je commence à apercevoir le
profil de ma mort’ (OR p. 289; ‘Like a traveler sailing the Archipelago
who sees the luminous mists lift toward evening, and little by little
makes out the shore, I begin to discern the profile of my death’, MH p.
16); ‘Tâchons d’entrer dans la mort les yeux ouverts…’ (OR p. 515;
‘Let us try, if we can, to enter death with open eyes…’, MH p. 247));
Billy the Kid in Ondaatje’s work may already be dead from the begin-
ning (‘These are the killed. [...] (By them) – | Charlie, Tom O’Folliard
| Angela D’s split arm, | and Pat Garrett | sliced off my head’, p. 6).
In The Autobiography of General Franco the autobiography of the
Spanish dictator can be written by another because Franco is dead.
There is a certain authority (in both the limiting and fully assertive
senses of the word ‘certain’) that comes from death. The words of the
dying over the living have a power that comes from their finality, from
their approaching the moment when time, already running out, can no
longer run out. There is a certain authority that comes from history,
the past, what has been and can no longer be changed. It is this
authority that these novels exploit, explore and, sometimes, explode.
As to my second point, the structural generic difference between
biography and autobiography, it is possible perhaps to encapsulate it as
follows: that biography is written by the living subject about an other
(preferably a dead other, because death is what allows for the com-
pleteness of the biography); and that autobiography is written by the
living I about the past but (inevitably) still living self. Autobiography,
by its own nature, is always incomplete, because the only autobiographical
statement that would complete it, ‘I am dead’, is the one impossible
assertion that cannot be uttered as a literal, autobiographical statement.
The novels I am concerned with in this essay – novels that place
themselves and their subjects on the very edge of death – may thus be
the only way in which the dead character can ‘truthfully’, though
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through the agency of another, utter the statement ‘I am dead’ and
achieve the completeness that autobiography is denied but that the
subject constantly desires.

Before returning to this desire for completeness and death, I must
explain my seemingly inconsistent inclusion of Tabucchi’s third-
person The Last Three Days of Fernando Pessoa within the category of
fictional autobiography. It is true of course that autobiographies in the
third person, or even autobiographies written as if they were the
(auto)biographies of another (such as, notably, Gertrude Stein’s The
Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas), are not a new phenomenon. But the
book poses several problems concerning its genre; in fact, it is unclear
what genre it belongs to at all: a very short novel? Novella? Short
story? Biographie romancée, as Nabokov’s characters would derogatorily
call it,10  but a biography concerned with writing a life only insofar as it
turns into writing a death, not so much even a thanatography as, rather,
a pathography: the life of a subject in a critical, terminal condition?
(Hadrian’s life story is also written from the perspective of the final,
fatal, malady.) The narrative, divided in three parts corresponding to
each of the last three days of Pessoa’s life (28, 29 and 30 November
1935), is followed by a note, or appendix, on ‘the characters who
appear in the book’, which gives brief biographical notes about Pessoa,
his employer, who accompanied him to the hospital, the barber who
shaved him for a last time, and the poet’s heteronyms, who visit Pessoa
on his sick bed. The best generic description may be the one given by
the book’s subtitle itself: Un delirio, as if delirium defined the genre to
which it belongs, in the same way as some books can be subtitled ‘A
Biography’, ‘A Novel’, ‘A Memoir’. ‘Delirium’ would presumably be a
neighbouring genre to that of the ‘Hallucination’, the subtitle of
another of Tabucchi’s works, Requiem.11
The nature of the subject contributes to the uncertainty: Fernando
Pessoa, a historical individual and yet a multiple subject who has
spoken, historically, in a plurality of voices and personae through his
heteronyms, each of them endowed with a biography, style, and corpus
of works (and that, of course, is exactly what ‘Pessoa’ means: persona –
another twist to the issues arising from the question, what’s in another’s
name?). Can we not then read this auto/biography as if it were written
by Pessoa speaking as one of his heteronyms? ‘Pessoa chiese una
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pozione di laudano, che era un sonnifero che era abituato a prendere
quando, in quanto Bernardo Soares, non riusciva a prendere sonno’
(UTG p. 17; ‘Pessoa asked for a dose of laudanum, a sedative he used
to take when, as Bernardo Soares, he couldn’t get to sleep’, LTD p. 95).
‘In quanto Bernardo Soares’ – as Bernardo Soares, qua Bernardo
Soares, insofar as Bernardo Soares; this game of pretending to pretend
(‘O poeta é um fingidor’, as Tabucchi loves to quote) opens up the
possibility that Tabucchi himself is figured, in the book and through
the book, as one of Pessoa’s heteronymic voices: The Last Three Days
of Fernando Pessoa is the book ‘I’ wrote when, in quanto Antonio Tabucchi
– as Antonio Tabucchi, qua Antonio Tabucchi, insofar as Antonio
Tabucchi – I wrote the biography of my own death. It is then possible to
describe The Last Three Days of Fernando Pessoa: A Delirium by
Antonio Tabucchi as Pessoa’s heterobiography of himself as Antonio
Tabucchi. (Tabucchi has recently published a collection of articles and
reflections on his works, under the title Autobiografie altrui, translatable
as Autobiographies of Others or, perhaps, even Heterobiographies.12 )
Delirium: a violent mental excitement, from the Latin delirare, deviate
from a straight line, from the furrow, whence to deviate, to become
deranged, crazy or delirious; from de + lira, ridge between furrows.13
Heterobiography: the speaking in another’s name under true pretences,
the wandering out of one’s identity into another’s. A kind of lucid
madness, a delirium, a working outside or beyond the furrows of
reason is at the centre of these works. Pessoa, within the delirium that
is his Last Three Days, acknowledges his own biographical delirium.
To his heteronym Alberto Caeiro, he says:
Le dirò, caro Caeiro, rispose, il fatto è che io avevo bisogno di una guida e di un
coagulante, non so se mi faccio capire, altrimenti la mia vita sarebbe andata in
frantumi, grazie a lei ho trovato una coesione. (UTG p. 25)
I will tell you, dear Caeiro, he replied. The fact is that I needed a guide and a
coagulant – I don’t know if I am making myself clear – otherwise my life would
have shattered into pieces. Thanks to you I found cohesion. (LTD p. 101)
Pessoa, in other words, found cohesion in splitting himself into
multiple personae. In the last section of the narrative, another
heteronym, Antonio Mora, visits the poet: they first met at the
sanatorium where Pessoa himself was a patient, and Mora taught him
about the plurality of the self. Pessoa lived constantly on the verge of
madness; his grandmother Dionísia had predicted that madness would
be his destiny:
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Pessoa [...] sentiva la voce di sua nonna Dionísia che era morta in manicomio.
Fernando, gli diceva sua nonna, tu sarai come me, perché buon sangue non mente,
e per tutta la vita avrai me per compagnia, perché la vita è una follia e tu saprai
come vivere la follia. (UTG pp. 15–16)
Pessoa [...] heard the voice of his grandmother Dionísia, who had died in a
madhouse. Fernando, his grandmother said to him, you will be like me, because
blood will tell, and all your life you will have me for company because life is
madness and you will know how to live in this madness. (LTD p. 94)
Yourcenar’s Hadrian also often refers to his delirium (for example,
OR p. 399; MH p. 127), his moments of madness or of non-reason, or
of expansion of the mind to include non-rational, non-logical thinking
(for example, OR, p. 306, p. 427; MH p. 33, p. 157). The writer
herself describes writing the novel as the development of ‘une méthode
de délire qui n’intéresserait que les insensés’ (‘Carnets de notes de
Mémoires d’Hadrien’, OR p. 526; ‘A method akin to controlled delirium,
of interest, probably, to none but madmen’, ‘Reflections on the Com-
position of Memoirs of Hadrian’, MH p. 275). Delirium as a method:
being taken out of oneself, but participating in the other consciously
and intentionally. Yourcenar qualifies her statement and in particular
the term ‘delirium’: ‘Encore ce dernier mot fait-il la part trop belle au
romantisme: parlons plutôt d’une participation constante, et la plus
clairvoyante possible, à ce qui fut’ (‘Carnets’, OR p. 526; ‘And yet this
term delirium smacks too much of romanticism; let us say, rather, a
constant participation, as intensely aware as possible, in that which has
been’, ‘Reflections’, MH p. 275).14  The qualification is important: what
is rejected is the Romantic idea of genius and inspiration, and also,
implicitly, of an automatic writing that bypasses the consciousness of
the artist. Yourcenar’s ‘delirium’ coincides with the clear-sighted partici-
pation in another mind, world and time, echoing Hadrian’s own ideal
of uniting knowledge, participation and sympathy to overcome the limits
of the self in a bid to approach immortality (OR p. 291; MH p. 18).
The desire to work within and yet deviate from the tracks of history
in a kind of ‘controlled delirium’ is also echoed in the Afterword to An
Imaginary Life:
It was partly to break into a field of more open possibilities that I set my narrative in
a remote place about which almost nothing is known, and in an age, the dawn of
the Christian era, in which mysterious forces were felt to be at work and thinking
had not yet settled into a rational mode. (IL p. 154, my emphases)
A similar moment of historical suspension, ‘the cusp [...] between two
cycles of time, the millennium of the old gods [...] and a new era’ (IL
EUP_CCS_01—Boldrini 28/9/04, 11:47 am249
 250
p. 19) – or, in this case, a lull, a pause between different epochs – is
evoked by Yourcenar through a remark made by Flaubert: ‘Les dieux
n’étant plus, et le Christ n’étant pas encore, il y a eu, de Ciceron à
Marc Aurèle, un moment unique où l’homme seul a été’ (‘Carnets’,
OR p. 519; ‘Just when the gods had ceased to be and the Christ had
not yet come, there was a unique moment in history, between Cicero
and Marcus Aurelius, when man stood alone’, ‘Reflections’, MH p.
269). In a later interview, Yourcenar explained: ‘The Memoirs of Hadrian
could only have been set in a moment of history when things looked
relatively bleak, a period of exhaustion – the exhaustion of the ancient
world figures prominently in the book – and yet a period when it was
still possible to believe that things would continue the same way for
some time to come. Fifty years later and it would have been too late,
fifty years earlier and it would have been too soon: people wouldn’t
have been aware of how fragile things were.’15  The space for the clear-
sighted exploration of the subject – a subject hinged to history and yet
(especially in An Imaginary Life) freed from it in the workings of the
imagination – is given in the moment that expands the rational and
suspends, or freezes, the historical; it is the moment when ‘thinking
[has] not yet settled into a rational mode’, a moment of fragility and
solitude when ‘man [stands] alone’, between an epoch already concluded
and one not yet begun: a moment that remains anchored to a precise
historical juncture and yet is outside, or between, the parallel tracks of
history, and whose exploration is a historical delirium through the voice
of another in a genre caught, perhaps torn, between opposing forces.
  ,  ,  
One step further from Berkeley’s ‘esse est percipi’ and engaging the
fundamental question of autobiography, Gertrude Stein’s much quoted
words, ‘I am I because my little dog knows me’,16  reverse the
Cartesian foundation of identity in self-knowledge (‘I think therefore I
am’), and, in locating self-knowledge instead outside the self and
outside modern rational discourse, anticipate Derrida’s notion of
‘otobiography’ in which the signatory of the autobiographical discourse
is not the self but the other: ‘it is the ear of the other that signs. The
ear of the other says me to me and constitutes the autos of my
autobiography.’17
The location of the aurobiographical in the other also underpins the
heterobiographies that are the focus of this essay. Yourcenar describes
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Mémoires d’Hadrien as ‘portrait d’une voix’, ‘the portrait of a voice’
(‘Carnets’, OR p. 527; ‘Reflections’, MH p. 275). The phrase is also
used to describe the novel Alexis, and it is in this version that it is
quoted and appropriated by Antonio Tabucchi: ‘Comme tout récit à la
première personne, Alexis est le portrait d’une voix’18 ). Indeed, the eye
and the voice are central to Tabucchi’s heterobiographical work. In
The Last Three Days of Fernando Pessoa, the Portuguese poet tells his
heteronym Alberto Caeiro: ‘Sì, confermò Pessoa, però per me lei è
stato un occhio e una voce, un occhio che descrive, una voce che
insegna ai discepoli, come Milarepa o Socrate’ (UTG pp. 24–5; ‘Yes,
Pessoa agreed, but for me you were an eye and a voice, an eye that
describes, a voice that teaches disciples, like Milarepa or Socrates’,
LTD p. 101). The self that risks breaking into a myriad fragments –
the multiplicity of Pessoa and of the modern self – is saved from
complete fragmentation and death by two masters who act, tradi-
tionally, as teachers and, here, as coagulants, gluing agents of the self,
but whose teachings are radically different: a mystic who learned to
change his body into any shape and to conquer his own self, and a
teacher of the rational, whose main principles included the imperatives to
know oneself and to live life in preparation for death. But the ‘eye’ and
the ‘voice’ also evoke another story: the tale of Echo and Narcissus.
In Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Tiresias answers Liriope’s question as to
whether her son Narcissus would live a long life with the prophetic but
obscure reply that he will live, as long as he does not come to know
himself (‘Si se non noverit’).19  Narcissus – whose fate is the agony of
unrequited desire that leads him to distraction from the moment he
gazes upon himself, and the agony of unrequitable desire that leads him
to destruction from the moment he recognizes himself in the face of
the beloved – must be denied self-knowledge if he is to live and be sane.
Autobiography, whose project is founded on self-speculation and in
the desire for self-possession, is defined by a tension: on the one hand,
the Socratic philosophical imperative ‘Know Thyself’; on the other,
the prohibition to know oneself, the curse of Narcissus. Because of
Narcissus, the Socratic requirement can never be fully achieved;
because of Socrates, the drama of Narcissus cannot be fully played out.
Indeed the tension between Socrates and Narcissus must be preserved:
tipping the balance one way or another leads to death, whether by
hemlock or by daffodil.
It could in fact be argued that autobiography, the reflection of and
on the self, reverses the fate of Narcissus: whereas the youth’s recognition
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of himself – iste ego sum (l. 463) – leads him to derangement and
eventually death, as the prophet had warned, the recognition of oneself
as oneself – I am that one, iste ego sum – is the precondition of the
success of the autobiographical project. However, the temporal
distance that determines the autobiographical – I write now of myself
then – prevents this simultaneous specular identity. The temporal
denial of self-identity is indeed already implicit in the ‘re-’ of re-
cognition, which doubles up the Socratic imperative for self-cognition
into a repetition of the same as other. If for Narcissus the repetition of
the visual image is always simultaneous, for Echo the structure of
repetition implies, and is determined by, temporal distance. The drama
of the autobiographical thus trebles up and is played out between
Socrates, Narcissus and Echo, and indeed it is the latter that appears to
give it meaning: if repeating the words of others is her punishment,
Echo nevertheless manages to turn this affliction to advantage, giving
new meanings to the words she repeats by lending voice to her desire.
‘Huc coeamus’, says Narcissus, ‘let us meet here’; but Echo’s
‘coeamus’, confirming her desire to meet, also expresses her desire for
a sexual encounter. When Narcissus rejects her – ‘emoriar, quam sit
tibi copia nostri’ (‘I would die before I’d let you touch me’, ‘give you
power over me’, ‘give you enjoyment of me’) – his words are countered
by Echo’s desire, ‘sit tibi copia nostri’ (‘I would give you power over
me’, ‘I would have you touch me’, ‘I would give you enjoyment of
me’).20  Echo’s predicament, and not only Narcissus’s, can thus also be
taken to allegorize the condition of autobiography, whose meaning is
determined not (or at least not only) by the past, but by the structure
imposed through the present narrative. Autobiography is caught between
parallel and constantly diverging tracks or furrows, working within,
but permanently diverging from them: then and now; selfhood and
otherness; simultaneity of speculation and temporality of re-significa-
tion. Oscillating between history and literature, autobiography is also
caught between the mythical and the philosophical. By their evocation
of this interplay between Socrates, Narcissus and Echo, fictional auto-
biographies of historical characters, or heterobiographies, bring to the
fore what is also true of autobiography: that the resolution of the
autobiographical dilemma comes not through the desire to say ‘I know
myself’ and ‘I am that one’, but by the ability to say ‘I am all those ones’.
Yet the split between self and other, subject and object that originates
in the moment of self-reflection and that is inherent in any autobio-
graphical act (and which doubles the moment in the development of the
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subject that Lacan has called the mirror stage), engenders a desire – by
definition unachievable – to re-unify the subject and recompose the
fissure between self and world (a desire to recover that original pre-
symbolic – or, in Kristeva’s terms, semiotic – state). The regression to
the original moment of plenitude and self-sufficiency when language
and self-consciousness were not yet present, however, can only be
realised through death, when language is lost and conscious self-specu-
lation can no longer take place. The paradox is that, while desiring to
transcend its own divisions, the autobiographical subject also desires to
experience this renewed state of plenitude consciously. This desire may
be one of the prime reasons for the consistent location of the
‘heterobiographical’ subject on the edge of death, and, indeed, for the
appeal of the genre itself. It is this impossibility that is dramatized in
the narrative and thematic structure of An Imaginary Life, and it is
therefore to this novel that I now wish to return in some more detail.
 
At the end of the novel, Ovid and the Child have crossed the Danube
and are walking through the steppes of the north:
And so we come to it, the place. I have taken my last step [...]. From here I
ascend, or lower myself, grain by grain, into the hands of the gods. It is [...] the
point on the earth’s surface where I disappear. (IL p. 150)
I described earlier the dynamic tension between historicity and
fictionality that drives the novel, and I would like to come back to what
Malouf calls ‘a fiction with its roots in possible event’ (Afterword, IL
p. 153). ‘Roots’ is the operative word here, evoking – as it inevitably
does when we are dealing with the poet of the Metamorphoses – the
transformations of characters into trees, plants, flowers that Ovid des-
cribed, and in particular perhaps evoking Daphne, whose metamorphosis
into the laurel symbolic of poetic glory suggests a fitting end for Ovid.
‘Roots’ could thus be therefore what the Roman poet develops in
reaching ‘the place’, the ‘point on the earth’s surface’ where his flight
from Tomis ends, and he becomes one with/in the earth.
Such a reading of Ovid’s death as a final and literal metamorphosis
seems to be encouraged by David Malouf’s assertion in the Afterword
that he wanted to make Ovid ‘live out in reality’ – with all the ambi-
guities we have seen to be implied in this expression – the ‘changes’ to
which he had subjected his characters in his work (IL p. 154). Yet
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there is nothing in the text itself that requires such reading: Ovid, tired
from the escape and the harsh walk over frozen terrain, could simply
and naturally lie on the ground and pass away at this point, returning
to the earth in the universal and eternal cycle of transformation of
matter. Thus ‘roots’ carries a dual and somewhat contradictory read-
ing: taken literally, it suggests the literary dazzle of metamorphosis;
taken figuratively, it describes a more ‘realistic’ natural death. It is
Malouf’s / Ovid’s metaphoric and metamorphic poetic language that
generates such double readings. A particularly significant example of
this can be found right at the end of the novel, when the Child drops
‘useless pebbles that where they strike the ground suddenly flare up as
butterflies’ (IL p. 152). John Stephens, observing that at the end of An
Imaginary Life ‘figuration becomes particularly problematic’, asks:
‘Does the sun strike the fallen pebbles so that they send up reflected
light which might be compared on the one hand to a sudden fire and
on the other to sunshine on the wings of butterflies, or do the stones
fall, change into butterflies, and fly up again?’ Stephens’s conclusion
that, at the end, ‘metamorphosis may turn out to be no more than a
trick of language’ and that ‘the narrator [...] may once again have
become the victim of language’ seems to me, however, to miss a central
point.21  Of course the metamorphosis is a trick of language (we are
reading a book, after all, and poems were Ovid’s trade) – but so would
be the realism of a natural death in this fictional account. The issue is
not one of mutually exclusive alternatives of which one is truer than
another, but of the coexistence of conflicting but equally valid narra-
tive alternatives; to regard Ovid simply as the victim of a linguistic
trick would be to disregard both his desire to return to a state of
plenitude and the similar unachievable desire to overcome the split
between self and world inherent in any autobiographical project.
Ovid’s disappearance into the earth at ‘the dawn of the Christian
era, in which mysterious forces were felt to be at work’ (Afterword, IL
p. 154) may also call up another kind of historical grounding: a third,
conflicting narrative of Ovid’s life and death and his returning to the
earth that involves (anachronistically and yet appropriately to the
historical moment from which Christianity was born), an echo of the
Christian burial service, ‘earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust’.
Yet again, the Afterword takes up a suggestion already present in the
main text, where Ovid, echoing Yeats’s ‘The Second Coming’, intro-
duces himself: ‘I am the poet Ovid – born on the cusp [...] between
two cycles of time, the millennium of the old gods, that shudders to its
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end, and a new era that will come to its crisis at some far point in the
future I can barely conceive of’ (IL p. 19). In this context, the wild
child captured by Ovid and the villagers during a hunt in the woods,
whose footprints had been sighted in previous years, seen by the
villagers as a portent or a demon and whom Ovid wishes to make
human, may put us in mind of another Child who was living at this
particular moment in history, a Child at once human and divine whose
advent will bring the old gods and their Empire to an end, and whose
‘new era’ will ‘come to its crisis’ in a future which is made to coincide
with our time (‘in the future I can barely conceive of, and where you,
reader, sit in a lighted room’, Ovid continues in the sentence just
quoted, directly placing us in this time of crisis). This feral Child,
always spelt with the capital C, whose main teaching to Ovid is silence,
may thus, paradoxically, also evoke the incarnation of the Word.
The interplay between the narrative’s and the Afterword’s complex
ambiguities thus frames the existence of Ovid’s ‘Imaginary Life’ within
these unresolved poles, both within and outside history, transcending
it and yet immanent to it, pure dazzling imagination and yet
historically determined.
If the historical conjuncture is precise and yet mysterious, so is the
geographical location, a place ‘about which almost nothing is known’
(Afterword IL p. 154) but which we can exactly pinpoint to the Getic
village of Tomis, on the Black Sea, now the modern Romanian city of
Constant ≈a. Bridging geography and history, the Afterword also locates
Ovid in a changing but clear trajectory of literary / historical
interpretations and successive re-appropriations of his life and works,
symptomatic of the Western fascination with the figure, work and fate
of the poet. Malouf describes how, in the Middle Ages,
Ovid became a popular figure of mythology and the search for his grave resulted
in the veneration of several legendary but spurious sites, some of them as far from
his original place of exile as central Hungary. [...] To the Renaissance reader Ovid
was the most modern of the Latin poets. (IL p. 154)
The ‘place’ where Ovid disappears (IL p. 150) is the place where he
keeps reappearing in the posthumous imagination as the subject of
myth. Malouf’s subjection of Ovid to the dazzle of his own fables thus
continues the tradition of appropriation and mythification of the
Roman poet, a lineage in which Malouf also inscribes himself. At the
same time, in its very structure of coexisting and conflicting narratives,
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in the multiple meanings elicited through the metaphoric and meta-
morphic duplicity of its language, and in the interplay between ‘Ovid’s’
story and the author’s Afterword, with its explicit references to
different epochs (the dawn of the Christian era, the Middle Ages, the
Renaissance, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century debates on the
Child of Nature, modern times), An Imaginary Life suggests the need
for a process of tracing back through these many layers the roots of
such myths and inscriptions. The polysemic nature of the text has
indeed led to a plurality of critical readings that would affiliate it with
(or engage it in a dialogue with) a number of different literary-
historical categories. As a text especially concerned with the relation-
ship between language and identity and almost explicitly invoking
Saussurian and Lacanian theories of language through its extended
reflection on signs, referents, signifiers and signifieds – and a trajec-
tory, Ovid’s, that could be described in terms of overcoming the
mediation of the Symbolic for an encounter with (or a return to) the
Real, with which the Imaginary finally coincides22  – the novel can be
seen to share concerns central to much postmodernist literature. In
thematizing the plight of the writer who, at the edge of the Empire and
away from its metropolitan centre, needs to find a new language and a
new model of autonomous subjectivity, An Imaginary Life proposes
itself as a quintessentially Australian, or postcolonial, novel, although
some accuse the novel of betraying the postcolonial condition insofar as
its resolution (Ovid’s final passivity and his desire to go beyond
language and beyond the human) does not offer any viable political
postcolonial position, the dissolution of subjectivity that Ovid em-
braces at the end representing the denial of an autonomous, coherent
and solid identity for the postcolonial subject.23  Modernism’s simul-
taneous emphasis on exile and dispossession and on the imaginative
transcendence of differences exists alongside a (romantic and modernist)
primitivism that seeks in less developed cultures the authenticity lost
by a dehumanising modernity, but the novel can also be interpreted as
a post-colonial reply to other modernist responses to the primitive: in
the wilderness of Australia, Richard Somers, the protagonist of D. H.
Lawrence’s Kangaroo (1923),
understood now that the Romans had preferred death to exile. He could
sympathize now with Ovid on the Danube, hungering for Rome and blind to the
land around him, blind to the savages. So Somers felt blind to Australia, and blind
to the uncouth Australians. To him they were barbarians [...]. He surveyed them
from an immense distance, with a kind of horror.24
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Whether intentionally or coincidentally,25  Malouf’s novel ‘writes back’
to Lawrence’s vision of Australia by making the exiled Latin poet
undergo a transformation that reveals the ‘raw life’ of the ‘savages’
around him to be closer to the ‘unity of things’ and allowing Ovid to
see the world ‘differently’ and feel himself ‘loosen and flow again’ (IL
p. 65). An Imaginary Life also inscribes itself within the Romantic
tradition, in its thematizing of the desire to overcome the breach
between Man and Nature in an encompassing integration; echoes of
Emerson, of Wordsworth’s ‘Tintern Abbey’, ‘Intimations of Immor-
tality’ and The Prelude have all been traced.26  But Malouf’s novel also
engages other historical, literary and philosophical debates that precede
the Romantic and post-Romantic concerns just outlined. The After-
word identifies a key source for his story of a wild child brought back
into the human community:
The encounter with the Child, which makes up the main part of this book, has no
basis in fact, but I have verified my description from the best account we have of
such a phenomenon, J.M.G. Itard’s painstaking observations of Victor, the wild
boy of Aveyron, which no writer on the subject can ignore. (IL p. 154)
The story of Itard’s attempt to educate the wild boy he called Victor
is well documented, and Malouf’s references to it are often very
precise.27  Also important, ‘growing as it does out of the eighteenth
century’ (Afterword, IL p. 154), is the place of Itard within the debate
on the state of nature, the natural man, and what constitutes the
essence of being human. Rousseau and Condillac were the central
figures of the debate (Itard was a follower of the latter and a critic of
the former), but going back through the eighteenth century, whose
context Malouf invokes, one would have to take note of other inter-
ventions, such as Defoe’s 1726 Mere Nature Delineated; Or, a Body
without a Soul (a treatise containing his observations on the wild boy
Peter of Hanover, who was brought into English society and became an
object both of general curiosity and of learned discussion on what
makes humans human, on the relationship between man and nature,
between the primitive and civilization); and, going further back,
Montaigne’s essays, in particular ‘On the Cannibals’ and its discussion
of the Noble Savage in the context of other imperial and colonial
expansions.28  (Montaigne, in turn, brings the discussion back to Greek
and Roman sources, including Herodotus, who would have been one of
the referents of the Latin world for the understanding of the nature of
the barbarous people of the north among whom Ovid finds himself in
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his exile, and who provides Malouf with information about the Scythians
(Afterword, IL p. 153)). Key for most participants in this philosophical
debate is the role of language in the definition of the human, insofar as
language is the highest expression of a rationality conferred by the soul
and distinguishing man from brute. Malouf’s novel, with its multiple
and conflicting narratives, can thus also be read as a meditation on and
dramatization of what constitutes the essence of the human, the place
of language and the ability for linguistic self-expression within such
definition, the issue of language being of course also central to
autobiography, at least since Augustine,29 and to man’s self-definition
as an individual.
This framework, placing the investigation into the nature of the
human at the centre of the novel, shows that the layers of literary and
philosophical references in An Imaginary Life are essential to the
construction of Ovid as a subject, and their ‘excavation’ (as in an
archaeological process) central to the novel’s investigation of the
(autobiographical) subject. Thus, alongside the many allusions to
Romantic poetry identified by critics, I would argue that the novel also
evokes another key Romantic text, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, which
also engages with Rousseau’s theories of the relationships between man
and nature, language and education.30  Distinct parallels can be found
in the escape north, among the ‘floating sheets of ice’ that surround
Walton’s ship and his groaning companions in Frankenstein (F pp. 12–
13) and over ‘the groaning, the cracking, the grinding’ of the ‘ice floes’
of An Imaginary Life (IL p. 137); in the winter, which ‘has been
dreadfully severe’ – ‘but the spring promises well’ (F p. 11), just like in
An Imaginary Life, where the frozen winter is followed by the ‘signs of
spring’, ‘everywhere about us’ (IL p. 143); in the sense of expectation
with which Walton anticipates going to ‘unexplored regions, to “the
land of mist and snow”’ (F p. 11), or with which Ovid and the Child
cross into the unknown world north of the Danube – a land so
unexplored that Ovid even doubts its existence (IL pp. 137–8); in the
travelling breeze, ‘warm with the first breath of spring’ (IL p. 143),
that ‘fills’ Walton ‘with delight’ (F p. 7) as much as it does Ovid and
the Child, left ‘glorying at last’ in the open freedom of the empty
landscape (IL p. 141) ‘stretched out in every direction’ (F13); in
particular, in the foregrounding of the conflicting relationship between
nature and culture, of the question of the state of nature and the
natural man – a question that centres, for Ovid / Malouf on the Child,
and for Frankenstein / Shelley on ‘the creature’: ‘innocent’ beings who
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would learn human language in order to be admitted to the company of
human beings, but who ultimately fail to bridge the gap that separates
them from the human community – with much more sinister and
malevolent consequences in Frankenstein than in An Imaginary Life,
but in both cases at the cost of the death of other human beings. Both
An Imaginary Life and Frankenstein are in sum explorations of the
limits of human nature, the boundary between culture and nature, and
what lies on either side of that boundary. Both are stories of the search
for the origin of life and for the original man; of man’s ascent and
regression up and down the ladder of being (IL pp. 74, 95), and of the
failure of civilization to look upon man in the original state of nature
and accept it for what it is – which is also the failure of civilization to
look upon itself and accept itself for what it is.

David Malouf’s imaginary life of Ovid, the poet of metamorphoses and
of myth, is thus also a quest for origins and originality (the story of the
Child raised by the wolves recalling the origins of Rome and of the
wolf-children Romulus and Remus), and the novel inscribes itself
within this long-running historical philosophical and literary debate on
the definition of man in his relation with nature and with the idea of
nature. Yet for Rousseau the state of nature is not a real, historical,
original condition but a hypothetical one – nor, indeed, is it that ideal
either. When men live in isolation and have no social bonds or feelings,
they experience neither happiness nor sadness; when their relation-
ships are motivated purely by the physical need to survive and perpe-
tuate the species – to eat, to drink, to mate – they are no longer all that
distinguishable from beasts. The ability to satisfy every desire and
need allows for peaceful living, but in this condition man has no (and
no need of any) morals. Men become really human only from the
moment they employ their rational faculties, form societies and
develop a language of communication and exchange.31  As it is also in
Condillac, Defoe, Montaigne, full humanity is inextricably linked with
the acquisition of language. Ovid intuitively knows this when he
connects the Child’s ability to speak a human word in the delirium of
his fever with the proof of the Child’s final belonging to the human
(IL p. 118). Yet it is silence that Ovid finally seeks, a silence that
abolishes human language in the name of a desire for that nostalgic,
utopian, and ultimately only imaginary ideal of complete naturalness.
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This ‘true language’ consists of the ‘speech in silence’ of infancy, a
language ‘whose every syllable is a gesture of reconciliation’ and of
continuity with the thing signified (IL pp. 96–8), beyond symbolization
and representation, without mediation. It is a language that, imposs-
ibly, would allow the journey back through the mirror stage, beyond
the moment of self-speculation that inaugurated both the acquisition of
language and the autobiographical act. The desire for total originality
meets the desire for total finality; the desire for absolute transcendence
of the divisions imposed by language and culture coincides with a
desire for absolute immanence in nature. Yet this can only be a self-
annihilating desire, because the return by choice to the original natural
state is impossible: the natural state, as Rousseau also knew, has liter-
ally no place for the human: returning to it is as utopian as the desire
consciously to experience one’s own death, or return to the pre-
linguistic, semiotic state of infancy. The voyage back through the mirror
– the return to the state of non-division – can only be achieved in death,
‘earth to earth, dust to dust, ashes to ashes’, in the metamorphosis into
an element of the natural landscape, in the annihilation of self and/or
self consciousness. The desire to bypass the self-speculation of the
autobiographical can only resolve in the thanatographical (‘I know what
it is we are looking for. It is the grave of the poet Ovid – Publius
Ovidius Naso, Roman of the equestrian order, poet,’ IL p. 18). The ‘place’
reached by Ovid at the end is a literal u-topia, a place that only exists
in the myths that our culture constantly constructs and that philoso-
phical investigations build on, giving them body, but whose layers
philosophical and literary investigations constantly peel off again. The
conclusion of Ovid’s journey mirrors, and dramatizes, the conclusion
of heterobiography, driven by the desire to become the other without
mediation, annulling the difference that separates subject from object,
the self from the world, bypassing the temporal split that separates the
writing I from the written I in order to be whole, and yet maintain the
self-consciousness that would enable the subject to live through death.
It is the utopia that makes Hadrian bid, at the end, ‘Let us try, if we
can, to enter into death with open eyes…’.
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